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Abstract
We study the computational complexity of several scenarios of strategic behavior
for the Kemeny procedure in the setting of judgment aggregation. In particular,
we investigate (1) manipulation, where an individual aims to achieve a better group
outcome by reporting an insincere individual opinion, (2) bribery, where an external
agent aims to achieve an outcome with certain properties by bribing a number of
individuals, and (3) control (by adding or deleting issues), where an external agent
aims to achieve an outcome with certain properties by influencing the set of issues
in the judgment aggregation situation. We show that determining whether these
types of strategic behavior are possible (and if so, computing a policy for successful
strategic behavior) is complete for the second level of the Polynomial Hierarchy.
That is, we show that these problems are Σp2-complete.
1 Introduction
An important topic in the research field of computational social choice is the (im)possibility
of strategic behavior in collective decision making. This is epitomized by the eminence of
results such as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [16, 22], that identifies various conditions
under which strategic voting (or manipulation) is, in principle, unavoidable. Manipulation in
voting is a typical example of strategic behavior, and involves individuals reporting insincere
preferences with the aim of obtaining a group outcome that is preferable for them.
Since strategic behavior in collective decision making is generally considered to be (so-
cially) undesirable, a lot of research effort has been invested in diagnosing what social choice
procedures are resistant to strategic behavior, and under what conditions. An important
research direction along these lines investigates how computational complexity can be used
to establish that various social choice procedures are (in many cases) practically immune to
strategic behavior [2, 5]. For example, in many cases, it is in principle possible to manipulate
voting rules (by reporting insincere preferences), but determining what insincere preference
leads to a better outcome is computationally so demanding that it prevents manipulative
behavior from being a useful policy.
Contributions In this paper, we use the framework of computational complexity theory
to study several scenarios of strategic behavior in the setting of judgment aggregation.
Judgment aggregation studies collective decision making on a set of issues that are logically
related [12]. In particular, we study three scenarios of strategic behavior for the Kemeny
judgment aggregation procedure—which is one of the most prominent judgment aggregation
procedures known from the literature. We investigate:
1. manipulation, where an individual reports an insincere individual judgment in an
attempt to enforce a preferable group judgment (from their poin
2. bribery, where an external party bribes several individuals that are involved in the
group decision process (that is, the briber stipulates their individual judgments) in
order to obtain a group judgment with certain properties; and
3. control, where an external party controls the set of issues that are involved in the
judgment aggregation setting, with the aim of achieving a group judgment with certain
properties.
Concretely, we study various different decision problems that formalize the computational
tasks involved in the strategic behavior in each of these scenarios. We show that all the
computational problems that we consider in this paper are Σp2-complete. That is, we show
that:
• Manipulation for the Kemeny rule in judgment aggregation is Σp2-complete.
• Bribery for the Kemeny rule in judgment aggregation is Σp2-complete.
• Control (by adding or removing issues) for the Kemeny rule in judgment aggregation
is Σp2-complete.
(Completeness for the complexity class Σp2 indicates that a problem is computationally
intractable. Even the easier problem of checking whether a given candidate solution is in
fact a solution is not efficiently solvable—it requires solving an NP-complete problem.)
Various different frameworks have been used in the literature to formalize the setting
of judgment aggregation (see, e.g., [13]). The computational complexity results that we
develop hold for two commonly considered judgment aggregation frameworks: formula-
based judgment aggregation and constraint-based judgment aggregation. We discuss these
judgment aggregation frameworks in more detail in Section 2.2. (In order to capture the
scenario of control naturally in the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework, we
consider a slightly extended variant of this framework. For more details, see Section 2.2.3.)
Most of the various forms of strategic behavior that we consider in this paper involve
the incentive of achieving a preferable group outcome. There are various ways to define
preference relations over (individual and group) judgments. The preferences that we study
are based on weighted Hamming distances. That is, we consider weight functions that
assign to each issue a weight that indicates how important it is for an individual (or for
an external party) that the group judgment agree with their judgment on this issue. Such
weight functions naturally induce preference relations over judgments.
In addition, we study variants of the strategic behavior scenarios where the objective is
to obtain a group judgment that includes a given set of conclusions. This can be seen as an
all-or-nothing variants (the group outcome either includes the required set of conclusions
or it does not), whereas the variants involving preferences based on weighted Hamming
distances offer a more gradual view (maybe the optimal outcome is not possible, but the
current outcome can still be improved slightly by behaving strategically).
Worst-case Complexity The computational intractability results that we provide in
this paper can be seen as positive results, since they show that various kinds of undesir-
able strategic behavior cannot be used efficiently across the board due to computational
complexity obstructions. However, it is important to emphasize that the computational
complexity results that we provide in this paper are worst-case complexity results. Worst-
case intractability results indicate that there is no algorithm that works efficiently in all
possible cases. However, it might well be the case that there are restricted settings where
several forms of strategic behavior are efficiently possible.
In order to consolidate the conclusion that strategic behavior for the Kemeny procedure
in judgment aggregation is computationally intractable, further research is needed. Such
further research would have to establish that the various forms of strategic behavior re-
main computationally intractable in many restricted settings. A key tool for establishing
computational complexity results for restricted settings is the paradigm of parameterized
complexity [10, 11, 15, 20]—this is a framework where the complexity of computational
problems is measured in a multi-dimensional way, in contrast to the classical theory of com-
putational complexity, where the complexity of problems is measured only in terms of the
input size in bits.
Related Work The concept of manipulation in judgment aggregation has been studied
before in the literature, both from an axiomatic point of view [4, 6, 8] and from a com-
putational complexity point of view [3, 14]. The complexity analysis of manipulation in
judgment aggregation that has been done in the literature is restricted to uniform premise-
based quota rules. Additionally, bribery in judgment aggregation has been studied from a
computational complexity point of view for uniform premise-based quota rules [3].
Outline We begin in Section 2 by considering relevant notions from computational com-
plexity and judgment aggregation that we use in this paper. Then, in Section 3, we develop
the intractability results for the scenario of manipulation. In Section 4, we turn to the sce-
nario of bribery, and in Section 5, we consider the scenario of control (by adding or deleting
issues). Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Before we turn to the complexity results that we develop in this paper, we review several
relevant concepts from computational complexity theory and judgment aggregation.
2.1 Complexity Theory
We begin with reviewing some basic notions from computational complexity. We assume
the reader to be familiar with the complexity classes P and NP, and with basic notions such
as polynomial-time reductions. For more details, we refer to textbooks on computational
complexity theory (see, e.g., [1]).
We briefly review the classes of the Polynomial Hierarchy (PH) [19, 21, 23, 24]. In order
to do so, we consider quantified Boolean formulas. A (fully) quantified Boolean formula (in
prenex form) is a formula of the form Q1x1Q2x2 . . . Qnxn.ψ, where all xi are propositional
variables, each Qi is either an existential or a universal quantifier, and ψ is a (quantifier-free)
propositional formula over the variables x1, . . . , xn. Truth for such formulas is defined in
the usual way.
To consider the complexity classes of the PH, we restrict the number of quantifier alter-
nations occurring in quantified Boolean formulas, i.e., the number of times where Qi 6= Qi+1.
We consider the complexity classes Σpk, for each k ≥ 1. Let k ≥ 1 be an arbitrary, fixed
constant. The complexity class Σpk consists of all decision problems for which there exists a
polynomial-time reduction to the problemQSatk, that is defined as follows. Instances of the
problem QSatk are quantified Boolean formulas of the form ∃x1 . . . ∃xℓ1∀xℓ1+1 . . .∀xℓ2 . . .
Qkxℓk−1+1 . . . Qkxℓk . ψ, where Qk = ∃ if k is odd and Qk = ∀ if k is even, where 1 ≤ ℓ1 ≤
· · · ≤ ℓk, and where ψ is quantifier-free. The problem is to decide if the quantified Boolean
formula is true. The complementary class Πpk consists of all decision problems for which
there exists a polynomial-time reduction to the problem co-QSatk, that is complementary
to the problem QSatk. The Polynomial Hierarchy (PH) consists of the classes Σ
p
k and Π
p
k,
for all k ≥ 1.
Alternatively, one can characterize the class Σp2 using nondeterministic polynomial-time
algorithms with access to an oracle for an NP-complete problem. Let O be a decision prob-
lem. A Turing machine M with access to an O oracle is a Turing machine with a dedicated
oracle tape and dedicated states qquery, qyes and qno. Whenever M is in the state qquery,
it does not proceed according to the transition relation, but instead it transitions into the
state qyes if the oracle tape contains a string x that is a yes-instance for the problem O,
i.e., if x ∈ O, and it transitions into the state qno if x 6∈ O. Intuitively, the oracle solves
arbitrary instances of O in a single time step. The class Σp2 consists of all decision problems
that can be solved in polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine that has access
to an O-oracle, for some O ∈ NP.
2.2 Judgment Aggregation
Next, we introduce the two formal judgment aggregation frameworks that we use in this
paper: formula-based judgment aggregation (as used by, e.g., [7, 14, 18]) and constraint-
based judgment aggregation (as used by, e.g., [17]). Moreover, we briefly discuss an extended
variant of the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework (as considered in, e.g., [13]).
2.2.1 Formula-Based Judgment Aggregation
We begin with the framework of formula-based judgment aggregation.
An agenda is a finite, nonempty set Φ of formulas that does not contain any doubly-
negated formulas and that is closed under complementation. Moreover, if Φ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn,
¬ϕ1, . . . ,¬ϕn} is an agenda, then we let [Φ] = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} denote the pre-agenda associated
to the agenda Φ. We denote the bitsize of the agenda Φ by size(Φ) =
∑
ϕ∈Φ |ϕ|. A judgment
set J for an agenda Φ is a subset J ⊆ Φ. We call a judgment set J complete if ϕ ∈ J
or ∼ϕ ∈ J for all ϕ ∈ Φ; and we call it consistent if there exists an assignment that
makes all formulas in J true. Intuitively, the consistent and complete judgment sets are the
opinions that individuals and the group can have.
We associate with each agenda Φ an integrity constraint Γ, that can be used to fur-
ther restrict the set of feasible opinions. Such an integrity constraint consists of a single
propositional formula. We say that a judgment set J is Γ-consistent if there exists a truth
assignment that simultaneously makes all formulas in J and Γ true. Let J (Φ,Γ) denote the
set of all complete and Γ-consistent subsets of Φ. We say that finite sequences J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+
of complete and Γ-consistent judgment sets are profiles, and where convenient we equate a
profile J = (J1, . . . , Jp) with the (multi)set {J1, . . . , Jp}. Moreover, for i ∈ [p], we let J−i
denote the profile (J1, . . . , Ji−1, Ji+1, . . . , Jp).
A judgment aggregation procedure (or rule) for the agenda Φ and the integrity con-
straint Γ is a function F that takes as input a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+, and that produces
a non-empty set of non-empty judgment sets. We call a judgment aggregation proce-
dure F resolute if for any profile J it returns a singleton, i.e., |F (J)| = 1; otherwise,
we call F irresolute. We call a judgment aggregation procedure F anonymous if for every
profile J = (J1, . . . , Jp) and for every permutation π : [p]→ [p] it holds that F (J) = F (J
′),
where J ′ = (Jπ(1), . . . , Jπ(p)). An example of a resolute, anonymous judgment aggregation
procedure is the strict majority rule Majority, where Majority(J) = {J∗}, where ϕ ∈ J∗
if and only if ϕ occurs in the strict majority of judgment sets in J , for all ϕ ∈ [Φ], and
where ϕ ∈ J∗ if and only if ∼ϕ 6∈ J∗, for all ϕ ∈ Φ. We call a judgment aggregation
procedure F complete and Γ-consistent, if J is complete and Γ-consistent, respectively,
for every J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+ and every J ∈ F (J). The procedure Majority is not consis-
tent. Consider the agenda Φ with [Φ] = {p, q, p → q}, and the profile J = (J1, J2, J3),
where J1 = {p, q, (p→ q)}, J2 = {p,¬q,¬(p→ q)}, and J3 = {¬p,¬q, (p→ q)}. The unique
outcome {p,¬q, (p→ q)} in Majority(J) is inconsistent.
The Kemeny aggregation procedure is based on a notion of distance. This distance is
based on the Hamming distance d(J, J ′) = |{ϕ ∈ [Φ] : ϕ ∈ (J \ J ′)∪ (J ′ \ J) }| between two
complete judgment sets J, J ′. Intuitively, the Hamming distance d(J, J ′) counts the number
of issues on which two judgment sets disagree. Let J be a single Γ-consistent and complete
judgment set, and let (J1, . . . , Jp) = J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)
+ be a profile. We define the distance
between J and J to be Dist(J,J) =
∑
i∈[p] d(J, Ji). Then, we let the outcome KemenyΦ,Γ(J)
of the Kemeny rule be the set of those J∗ ∈ J (Φ,Γ) for which there is no J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)
such that Dist(J,J) < Dist(J∗,J). (If Φ and Γ are clear from the context, we often
write Kemeny(J) to denote KemenyΦ,Γ(J).) Intuitively, the Kemeny rule selects those
complete and Γ-consistent judgment sets that minimize the cumulative Hamming distance
to the judgment sets in the profile. The Kemeny rule is irresolute, complete, Γ-consistent
and anonymous.
2.2.2 Constraint-Based Judgment Aggregation
We continue with the framework of constraint-based judgment aggregation.
Let I = {x1, . . . , xn} be a finite set of issues, in the form of propositional variables.
Intuitively, these issues are the topics about which the individuals want to combine their
judgments. A truth assignment α : I → B is called a ballot, and represents an opin-
ion that individuals and the group can have. We will also denote ballots α by a bi-
nary vector (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ B
n, where bi = α(xi) for each i ∈ [n]. Moreover, we say
that (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ {0, 1, ⋆}n is a partial ballot, and that (p1, . . . , pn) agrees with a bal-
lot (b1, . . . , bn) if pi = bi whenever pi 6= ⋆, for all i ∈ [n]. As in the case for formula-based
judgment aggregation, we introduce an integrity constraint Γ, that can be used to restrict
the set of feasible opinions (for both the individuals and the group). The integrity con-
straint Γ is a propositional formula on the variables x1, . . . , xn. We define the set R(I,Γ)
of rational ballots to be the ballots (for I) that satisfy the integrity constraint Γ. Rational
ballots in the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework correspond to complete and
Γ-consistent judgment sets in the formula-based judgment aggregation framework. We say
that finite sequences r ∈ R(I,Γ)+ of rational ballots are profiles, and where convenient we
equate a profile r = (r1, . . . , rp) with the (multi)set {r1, . . . , rp}. Moreover, for i ∈ [p], we
let r−i denote the profile (r1, . . . , ri−1, ri+1, . . . , rp).
A judgment aggregation procedure (or rule), for the set I of issues and the integrity
constraint Γ, is a function F that takes as input a profile r ∈ R(I,Γ)+, and that produces
a non-empty set of ballots. We call a judgment aggregation procedure F resolute if for any
profile r it returns a singleton, i.e., |F (r)| = 1; otherwise, we call F irresolute. We call a
judgment aggregation procedure F anonymous if for every profile r = (r1, . . . , rp) and for
every permutation π : [p] → [p] it holds that F (r) = F (r′), where r′ = (rπ(1), . . . , rπ(p)).
We call a judgment aggregation procedure F rational (or consistent), if r is rational for
every r ∈ R(I,Γ)+ and every r ∈ F (r).
As an example of a judgment aggregation procedure we consider the strict majority
rule Majority, where Majority(r) = {(b1, . . . , bn)} and where each bi agrees with the ma-
jority of the i-th bits in the ballots in r (in case of a tie, we arbitrarily let bi = 0). To
see that Majority is not rational, consider the set I = {x1, x2, x3} of issues, the integrity
constraint Γ = x3 ↔ (x1 → x2), and the profile r = (r1, r2, r3), where r1 = (1, 1, 1), r2 =
(1, 0, 0), and r3 = (0, 0, 1). The unique outcome (1, 0, 1) in Majority(r) is not rational.
The Kemeny aggregation procedure is defined for the constraint-based judgment aggre-
gation framework as follows. Similarly to the case for formula-based judgment aggregation,
the Kemeny rule is based on the Hamming distance d(r, r′) = |{ i ∈ [n] : bi 6= b′i }|, between
two rational ballots r = (b1, . . . , bn) and r
′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
n) for the set I of issues and the
integrity constraint Γ. Let r be a single ballot, and let (r1, . . . , rp) = r ∈ R(I,Γ)+ be a
profile. We define the distance between r and r to be Dist(r, r) =
∑
i∈[p] d(r, ri). Then, we
let the outcome KemenyI,Γ(r) of the Kemeny rule be the set of those ballots r
∗ ∈ R(I,Γ)
for which there is no r ∈ R(I,Γ) such that Dist(r, r) < Dist(r∗, r). (If I and Γ are clear
from the context, we often write Kemeny(r) to denote KemenyI,Γ(r).) The Kemeny rule is
irresolute, anonymous and rational.
2.2.3 Extended Constraint-Based Judgment Aggregation
Finally, we consider an extended variant of the constraint-based judgment aggregation
framework. In the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework, we consider a set I
of issues and an integrity constraint in the form of a propositional formula Γ that satisfies
the constraint that Var(Γ) ⊆ I. However, in some situations it is more convenient to allow
the integrity constraint Γ to contain additional variables. In the extended constraint-based
framework, we relax the condition that Var(Γ) ⊆ I, and we allow arbitrary propositional
formulas as integrity constraints. This modification requires us to adapt the notion of ra-
tionality accordingly. A ballot α : I → B is said to be rational if Γ[α] is satisfiable—that is,
if there is some truth assignment β : Var(Γ)\I → B such that α ∪ β satisfies Γ.
2.2.4 Preferences over Opinions
Strategic behavior for judgment aggregation (such as the problems of manipulation, bribery
and control) involves the incentive to obtain a “better” outcome. Therefore, in order to
study strategic behavior, it is essential to define a notion of preference over opinions—that
is, when is one opinion “better than” (or preferred over) another opinion.
In the worst case, the number of possible opinions that play a role is exponential in the
number of issues—e.g., form issues there could be up to 2m possible opinions. As a result, it
is unreasonable to expect agents to explicitly specify a preference relation over all (feasible)
opinions. Instead it makes more sense to use a compact specification language to represent
a preference relation over opinions. In this paper, we will use one such specification method
that can be used to capture a wide range of preferences. Various preference relations over
opinions have been studied in the literature [3, 6, 8].
We consider preferences based on a weighted Hamming distance. We define this weighted
Hamming distance for the setting of formula-based judgment aggregation. Definitions for
the setting of constraint-based judgment aggregation are entirely similar. Take an agenda Φ
together with an integrity constraint Γ. An agent can specify their preference relation over
complete and Γ-consistent judgment sets J ∈ J (Φ,Γ) by providing a weight function w :
[Φ]→ N that produces a weight w(ϕ) for each formula ϕ ∈ [Φ]. Intuitively, for each ϕ ∈ [Φ],
the weight w(ϕ) indicates how important it is for the agent that the outcome agrees with
their truthful opinion on the issue ϕ. (Alternatively, one could consider weight functions
that produce rational or real weights.) Then, for two complete judgment sets J1 and J2 the
weighted Hamming distance d(J1, J2, w) is defined as follows:
d(J1, J2, w) =
∑
{w(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ [Φ], ϕ ∈ (J1 \ J2) ∪ (J2 \ J1) }.
That is, for each formula ϕ ∈ [Φ] that J and J ′ disagree on, the weighted Hamming distance
is increased by w(ϕ).
Using this notion of weighted Hamming distance, we can define a preference relation for
an agent. Suppose that the agent’s truthful opinion is given by a complete and Γ-consistent
judgment set J . Moreover, suppose that the agent’s view on the relative importance of
the separate issues is given by a weight function w : [Φ] → N. Then the preference re-
lation ≤w,J for this agent is defined as follows. For any two complete and Γ-consistent
judgment sets J1, J2, it holds:
J1 ≤w,J J2 if and only if d(J, J1, w) ≤ d(J, J2, w).
Correspondingly, a judgment set J1 is (strictly) preferred over another judgment set J2
if and only if the weighted Hamming distance from J1 to J is (strictly) smaller than the
weighted Hamming distance from J2 to J .
A particular case of the weighted Hamming distance is the unweighted Hamming distance.
That is, the case where w(ϕ) = 1 for all ϕ ∈ [Φ]. Whenever the weight function w is the
constant function that always returns 1, we drop the “w” from the notation—that is, the
unweighted Hamming distance between two judgment sets J1 and J2 is denoted by d(J1, J2).
Other preference relations In the literature, there have been various proposals for
notions of preference over opinions. For example, the phenomenon of manipulation in judg-
ment aggregation has been studied in the settings (1) where one judgment set is preferred
over another if it agrees with a fixed optimal judgment set on at least one issue where the
other judgment set disagrees [8], and (2) where one judgment set is preferred over a second
judgment set if it agrees with a fixed optimal judgment set on at least one issue where
the second judgment set disagrees, and for all issues it holds that if the second judgment
set agrees with the optimal judgment set then the first judgment set also agrees with the
optimal [8]. Other preference relations that have been investigated are top-respecting prefer-
ences and closeness-respecting preferences. The class of top-respecting preferences contains
all preferences that prefer a single most preferred judgment set over all other judgment
sets (and the preference between the other judgment sets is arbitrary) [3, 6]. The class of
closeness-respecting preferences contains preferences that additionally satisfy the condition
of closeness: if one judgment set agrees with the most preferred judgment on a superset of
issues compared to another judgment set, then the one judgment is preferred over the other
[3, 6].
3 Manipulation
The first form of strategic behavior in judgment aggregation that we consider is manipula-
tion. This concerns cases where individuals aim to influence the outcome of the aggregation
procedure in their favor by reporting an insincere judgment, that is, by reporting a judgment
that differs from their beliefs.
For irresolute judgment aggregation procedures such as the Kemeny procedure, one
can consider various requirements on the strategically reported insincere judgments. For
instance, one could require that every outcome for the insincere judgment is preferred over
every outcome for the sincere judgment. Alternatively, one could require that there is at least
one outcome for the insincere judgment that is preferred over every outcome for the sincere
judgment. Correspondingly, we consider the following decision problems. (We formalize
these problems for the setting of formula-based judgment aggregation. For the setting of
constraint-based judgment aggregation, these problems are defined entirely similarly.)
Cautious-Manipulation(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ]→
N, and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+.
Question: Is there a complete and consistent judgment set J ′ ∈ J (Φ,Γ) such
that for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) and for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds that
d(J∗new, J1, w) < d(J
∗
old, J1, w)?
Optimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ]→
N, and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+.
Question: Is there a complete and consistent judgment set J ′ ∈ J (Φ,Γ) and
some J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) such that for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds that
d(J∗new, J1, w) < d(J
∗
old, J1, w)?
Pessimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ]→
N, and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+.
Question: Is there a complete and consistent judgment set J ′ ∈ J (Φ,Γ) such
that for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) there is some J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) such that
d(J∗new, J1, w) < d(J
∗
old, J1, w)?
Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ]→
N, and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+.
Question: Is there a complete and consistent judgment set J ′ ∈ J (Φ,Γ), some
J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) and some J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) such that d(J
∗
new, J1, w) <
d(J∗old, J1, w)?
Safe-Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ]→
N, and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+.
Question: Is there a complete and consistent judgment set J ′ ∈ J (Φ,Γ) such
that (1) for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) and for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it
holds that d(J∗new, J1, w) ≤ d(J
∗
old, J1, w), and such that (2) there exists some
J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) and some J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) such that d(J
∗
new, J1, w) <
d(J∗old, J1, w)?
3.1 Complexity Results
In this section, we prove the following result.
Theorem 1. The following problems are Σp2-complete:
• Cautious-Manipulation(Kemeny),
• Optimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny),
• Pessimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny),
• Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny), and
• Safe-Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny).
Moreover, Σp2-hardness holds already for the case where the manipulator’s preferences are
based on the unweighted Hamming distance.
This result follows from Propositions 2–5 and 7, and Corollaries 6 and 8, that we establish
below.
Proposition 2. Cautious-Manipulation(Kemeny) is in Σp2 .
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP
oracle that solves the problem. Let (Φ,Γ, w,J) specify an instance of Cautious-Mani-
pulation(Kemeny). The algorithm proceeds in several steps.
Firstly, (1) the algorithm determines the minimum distance dwinold from J to any complete
and consistent judgment set J∗ ∈ J (Φ,Γ). That is, dwinold is the cumulative unweighted
Hamming distance from the judgments in J to the judgment sets J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J). This
can be done in (deterministic) polynomial time using O(log n) queries to an NP oracle.
Then, (2) the algorithm determines the minimum distance dminold (weighted by w) from J1
to any judgment set J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J), that is, from J1 to any complete and consistent
judgment set J∗ that has cumulative unweighted Hamming distance dwinold to the profile J .
This can also be done in (deterministic) polynomial time using an NP oracle.
Next, (3a) the algorithm guesses a complete judgment set J ′ together with a truth
assignment α : Var(Φ,Γ) → B, and it checks whether α satisfies both J ′ and Γ. This
can be done in nondeterministic polynomial time. Moreover, (3b) the algorithm deter-
mines the minimum distance dwinnew from (J−1, J
′) to any complete and consistent judgment
set J∗ ∈ J (Φ,Γ). Finally, (3c) the algorithm determines by using a single query to an NP
oracle whether there exists some complete and consistent judgment set J∗new ∈ J (Φ,Γ) such
that d(J∗new, (J−1, J
′)) = dwinnew and d(J
∗
new, J1, w) ≥ d
min
old . If this is the case, the algorithm
rejects; otherwise, the algorithm accepts.
It is straightforward to verify that the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial
time. Moreover, the algorithm accepts the input (for some sequence of nondeterministic
choices) if and only if there is some complete and consistent judgment set J ′ such that for
all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) and for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds that d(J
∗
new, J1, w) <
d(J∗old, J1, w).
Proposition 3. Optimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny) is in Σp2 .
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP
oracle that solves the problem. Let (Φ,Γ, w,J) specify an instance of Optimistic-Mani-
pulation(Kemeny). The algorithm proceeds in several steps. For the first two steps,
the algorithm proceeds exactly as the algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 2.
That is, (1) the algorithm computes dwinold and (2) it computes d
min
old , both in deterministic
polynomial time using an NP oracle.
For the third step, the algorithm proceeds in a similar fashion as the algorithm described
in the proof of Proposition 2. That is, (3a) the algorithm guesses a complete judgment
set J ′ together with a truth assignment α : Var(Φ,Γ) → B, and it checks whether α
satisfies both J ′ and Γ. Also, (3b) the algorithm determines the minimum unweighted
Hamming distance dwinnew from (J−1, J
′) to any complete and consistent judgment set J∗ ∈
J (Φ,Γ). This can be done using O(log n) queries to an NP oracle. Then, (3c′) the algorithm
guesses some complete judgment set J∗new together with a truth assignment α
′ : Var(Φ,Γ)→
B, and it checks whether α′ satisfies both J∗new and Γ. Moreover, the algorithm checks
whether d(J∗new, (J−1, J
′)) = dwinnew—that is, J
∗
new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′)—and d(J∗new, J1, w) <
dminold , and accepts if and only if this is the case.
It is straightforward to verify that the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polyno-
mial time. Moreover, the algorithm accepts the input (for some sequence of non-
deterministic choices) if and only if there is some complete and consistent judgment
set J ′ and some J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) such that for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds
that d(J∗new, J1, w) < d(J
∗
old, J1, w).
Proposition 4. Pessimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny) is in Σp2 .
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP
oracle that solves the problem. Let (Φ,Γ, w,J) specify an instance of Pessimistic-Mani-
pulation(Kemeny). The algorithm proceeds in several steps. For the first step, the algo-
rithm proceeds exactly as the algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 2. That is, (1)
the algorithm computes dwinold in deterministic polynomial time using O(log n) queries to an
NP oracle.
Then, (2) the algorithm determines the maximum distance dmaxold (weighted by w) from J1
to any judgment set J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J), that is, from J1 to any complete and consistent
judgment set J∗ that has cumulative unweighted Hamming distance dwinold to the profile J .
This can also be done in (deterministic) polynomial time using an NP oracle.
Next, (3a) the algorithm guesses a complete judgment set J ′ together with a truth
assignment α : Var(Φ,Γ) → B, and it checks whether α satisfies both J ′ and Γ. This can
be done in nondeterministic polynomial time. Moreover, (3b) the algorithm determines the
minimum unweighted Hamming distance dwinnew from (J−1, J
′) to any complete and consistent
judgment set J∗ ∈ J (Φ,Γ). Finally, (3c) the algorithm determines by using a single query
to an NP oracle whether there exists some complete and consistent judgment set J∗new ∈
J (Φ,Γ) such that d(J∗new, (J−1, J
′)) = dwinnew and d(J
∗
new, J1, w) ≥ d
max
old . If this is the case,
the algorithm rejects; otherwise, the algorithm accepts.
It is straightforward to verify that the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial
time. Moreover, the algorithm accepts the input (for some sequence of nondeterministic
choices) if and only if there is some complete and consistent judgment set J ′ such that for
all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) there is some J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) such that d(J
∗
new, J1, w) <
d(J∗old, J1, w).
Proposition 5. Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny) is in Σp2 .
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP
oracle that solves the problem. Let (Φ,Γ, w,J) specify an instance of Superoptimistic-
Manipulation(Kemeny). The algorithm proceeds in several steps. For the first steps, the
algorithm proceeds exactly as the algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 2. That
is, (1) the algorithm computes dwinold , in deterministic polynomial time using O(log n) queries
to an NP oracle.
Then, (2′) the algorithm guesses a complete judgment set J∗old together with a truth
assignment γ : Var(Φ,Γ) → B, and it checks whether γ satisfies both J∗old and Γ, and
whether d(J∗old,J) = d
win
old .
For the third step, the algorithm proceeds in a similar fashion as the algorithm described
in the proof of Proposition 2. That is, (3a) the algorithm guesses a complete judgment set J ′
together with a truth assignment α : Var(Φ,Γ)→ B, and it checks whether α satisfies both J ′
and Γ. Also, (3b) the algorithm determines the minimum distance dwinnew from (J−1, J
′) to
any complete and consistent judgment set J∗ ∈ J (Φ,Γ). This can be done using O(log n)
queries to an NP oracle. Then, (3c′′) the algorithm guesses some complete judgment set J∗new
together with a truth assignment α′ : Var(Φ,Γ) → B, and it checks whether α′ satisfies
both J∗new and Γ. Moreover, the algorithm checks whether d(J
∗
new, (J−1, J
′)) = dwinnew—that
is, J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′)—and d(J∗new, J1, w) < d(J
∗
old, J1, w), and accepts if and only if
this is the case.
It is straightforward to verify that the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial
time. Moreover, the algorithm accepts the input (for some sequence of nondeterministic
choices) if and only if there is some complete and consistent judgment set J ′, some J∗new ∈
Kemeny(J−1, J
′) and some J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) such that d(J
∗
new, J1, w) < d(J
∗
old, J1, w).
Corollary 6. Safe-Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny) is in Σp2 .
Proof (sketch). The algorithms described in the proofs of Proposition 2 and 5 can straight-
forwardly be modified and combined to form a nondeterministic polynomial-time algo-
rithm with access to an NP oracle that solves Safe-Superoptimistic-Manipulation-
(Kemeny).
Proposition 7. Cautious-Manipulation(Kemeny) is Σp2-hard.
Proof. We show Σp2-hardness by giving a reduction from the satisfiability problem
for quantified Boolean formulas of the form ∃x1, . . . , xn.∀y1, . . . , ym.ψ. Let ϕ =
∃x1, . . . , xn.∀y1, . . . , ym.ψ be a quantified Boolean formula. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} and Y =
{y1, . . . , ym}. Without loss of generality, we assume that n is a multiple of 3—that is,
that n = 3n′ for some n′ ∈ N. We construct an agenda Φ, an integrity constraint Γ, a
weight function w : [Φ]→ N, and a profile J as follows.
We consider fresh variables x′1, . . . , x
′
n and fresh variables y
′
1, . . . , y
′
m. Moreover, we
consider fresh variables z1, . . . , zn/3, fresh variables t1, . . . , tm, fresh variables w1,ℓ for ℓ ∈
[n+1], fresh variables w2,ℓ for i ∈ {2, 3} and ℓ ∈ [n], and fresh variables ui,ℓ for i ∈ [3] and ℓ ∈
[u], where u = 10n+10m+10. We then let the agenda Φ consist of the variables x1, . . . , xn
and y1, . . . , ym and the fresh variables we introduced above, together with their negations.
That is, we let [Φ] = { xi, x′i : i ∈ [n] } ∪ { zi : i ∈ [n/3] } ∪ { yj, y
′
j , tj : j ∈ [m] } ∪ {w1,ℓ : ℓ ∈
[n+ 1] } ∪ {wi,ℓ : i ∈ {2, 3}, ℓ ∈ [n] } ∪ { ui,ℓ : i ∈ [3], ℓ ∈ [u] }.
We then define the integrity constraint Γ as follows. We let
Γ = Γ0 ∨
∨
i∈[3]
∧
ℓ∈[u]
ui,ℓ,
and
Γ0 =



 ∧
i∈[n]
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′
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∧
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w3,ℓ



 .
(Here ⊕ denotes exclusive disjunction.)
As a result of the definition of Γ, each complete and consistent judgment set J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)
satisfies (at least) one of the following four conditions.
1. For some i ∈ [3], the judgment set J includes each formula ui,ℓ for ℓ ∈ [u].
2. The judgment set J includes exactly one of xi and x
′
i for each i ∈ [n], it includes none
of the formulas zi, it includes exactly one of yj and y
′
j for each j ∈ [m], it includes none
of the formulas tj , it includes either all formulas w2,ℓ or all formulas w3,ℓ for ℓ ∈ [n],
and J does not satisfy ψ.
3. The judgment set J includes exactly one of xi and x
′
i for each i ∈ [n], it includes none
of the formulas zi, it includes all formulas tj , for each j ∈ [m] it includes either none
or both of yj and y
′
j, and it includes all formulas w1,ℓ for ℓ ∈ [n+ 1].
4. The judgment set J includes all formulas zi, for each i ∈ [n] it includes either none
or both of xi and x
′
i, it includes all formulas tj , for each j ∈ [m] it includes either
none or both of yj and y
′
j , and it includes either all formulas w2,ℓ or all formulas w3,ℓ
for ℓ ∈ [n].
We define w : [Φ]→ N by letting w(ϕ) = 1 for each ϕ ∈ [Φ]. In other words, we consider
the unweighted Hamming distance.
Finally, we let J = (J1, J2, J3), where J1, J2, J3 are defined as described in Table 1. In
this table, the indices i, j, ℓ range over all possible values, and for each ϕ ∈ [Φ] we write a 0
if ϕ 6∈ Ji and a 1 if ϕ ∈ Ji.
J xi x
′
i zi yj y
′
j tj w1,ℓ w2,ℓ w3,ℓ u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
J2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
J3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Table 1: The profile J = (J1, J2, J3) that we use in the proof of Proposition 7.
In the remainder, we will argue that there is some truth assignment α : X → B such
that for all truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true if and only if
there is some complete and consistent judgment set J ′1 ∈ J (Φ,Γ) such that for all J
∗
new ∈
Kemeny(J−1, J
′) and for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds that d(J
∗
new, J1) < d(J
∗
old, J1).
Firstly, we observe that Kemeny(J) = {J∗old,1, J
∗
old,2}, where J
∗
old,1 and J
∗
old,2 are defined
as described in Table 2. Both J∗old,1 and J
∗
old,2 are complete and consistent, and have a
cumulative Hamming distance of 7n + 3m + 1 + 3u to the profile J . It is straightforward
to verify that no complete and consistent judgment set has a smaller cumulative Hamming
distance to the profile J . (For instance, the judgment sets of the form J∗α, as described
below in Table 3, have a cumulative Hamming distance of 7n+3m+2+3u to the profile J .)
Kemeny(J) xi x
′
i zi yj y
′
j tj w1,ℓ w2,ℓ w3,ℓ u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J∗old,1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
J∗old,2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Table 2: The judgment sets J∗old,1 and J
∗
old,2 that are used in the proof of Proposition 7.
Next, we argue that the only way for agent 1 to enforce an outcome that is closer
to J1 than J
∗
old,1 and J
∗
old,2 are, is to enforce an outcome J
∗ that satisfies condition (3).
It is impossible for agent 1 to force a complete and consistent judgment set that satisfies
condition (1) to be a Kemeny outcome, because there are complete and consistent judgment
sets at smaller distance to the profile for any judgment J ′1 that agent 1 reports (e.g., the
judgment sets J∗old,1 and J
∗
old,2). For each of the complete and consistent judgment sets
that satisfy condition (2), the Hamming distance to J1 is at least as much as the Hamming
distance from J1 to J
∗
old,1 and J
∗
old,2. Among the complete and consistent judgment sets that
satisfy condition (4), the judgment sets J∗old,1 and J
∗
old,2 are of smallest Hamming distance
to J1. Therefore, there is no insincere judgment J
′
1 that agent 1 can report to obtain a
Kemeny outcome satisfying condition (4) that is of smaller Hamming distance to J1. This
means that if agent 1 were to enforce a Kemeny outcome J∗new that is of smaller Hamming
distance to J1 than J
∗
old,1 and J
∗
old,2 are (by reporting an insincere judgment J
′
1), then J
∗
new
must satisfy condition (3).
We continue with observing several further properties that each complete and consistent
judgment set J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) must satisfy. We know that J∗new includes none of
the formulas yj and y
′
j , as including these would strictly increase the Hamming distance to
the profile. Similarly, J∗new includes none of the formulas w2,ℓ, w3,ℓ and ui,ℓ.
Finally, we argue that there is some truth assignment α : X → B such that for all truth
assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true if and only if there is some complete
and consistent judgment set J ′1 ∈ J (Φ,Γ) such that for all J
∗
new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′) and for
all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds that d(J
∗
new, J1) < d(J
∗
old, J1).
(⇒) Suppose that there exists some truth assignment α : X → B such that for all truth
assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α∪ β] is true. Consider the complete and consistent
judgment set Jα that is described in Table 3. We then get that Kemeny(J−1, Jα) = {J∗α},
where J∗α is also described in Table 3. The only possible complete and consistent judgment
sets J∗ that could have a smaller Hamming distance to the profile (J−1, Jα) would have
to satisfy condition (2). That is, such judgment sets J∗ would have to include exactly
one of yj and y
′
j , for each j ∈ [m], and would have to satisfy ¬ψ. Moreover, in order for
such judgment sets J∗ to have a smaller Hamming distance to the profile, it would have
to agree with J∗α on the formulas xi and x
′
i, for all i ∈ [n]. However, since ψ[α] is valid,
we know that such judgment sets J∗ are not consistent. Therefore, Kemeny(J−1, Jα) =
{J∗α}. Clearly, d(J1, J
∗
α) < d(J1, J
∗
old,i) for both i ∈ [2]. In other words, for all J
∗
new ∈
Kemeny(J−1, Jα) and for all J
∗
old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds that d(J
∗
new, J1) < d(J
∗
old, J1).
xi x
′
i zi yj y
′
j tj w1,ℓ w2,ℓ w3,ℓ u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
Jα α(xi) 1− α(xi) 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
J∗α α(xi) 1− α(xi) 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3: The judgment sets Jα and J
∗
α that are used in proof of Proposition 7.
(⇐) Conversely, suppose that there is some complete and consistent judgment set J ′1 ∈
J (Φ,Γ) such that for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J
′
1) and for all J
∗
old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds
that d(J∗new, J1) < d(J
∗
old, J1). As we argued above, each such complete and consistent
judgment set J∗new satisfies condition (3), and furthermore, it does not contain any of the
formulas yj, y
′
j , w2,ℓ, w3,ℓ and ui,ℓ. That is, such a judgment set J
∗
new must be of the form J
∗
α,
for some α : X → B, as described in Figure 3. Fix this truth assignment α : X → B. It
suffices to consider insincere judgment sets J ′1 that minimize the distance to the judgment
set J∗α—that is, it suffices to consider the situation where J
′
1 = J
∗
α. (The following argument
works regardless of the judgment of J ′1 on the formulas u1,ℓ.) In other words, we consider
the profile J ′ = (J−1, J
∗
α).
We now use the fact that J∗α ∈ Kemeny(J
′) to argue that for all truth assignments β :
Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true. We proceed indirectly, and assume that there exists
some truth assignment β : Y → B such that ψ[α ∪ β] is false. Then consider the complete
xi x
′
i zi yj y
′
j tj w1,ℓ w2,ℓ w3,ℓ u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J∗β α(xi) 1− α(xi) 0 β(yj) 1− β(yj) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table 4: The judgment set J∗β that is used in the proof of Proposition 7.
and consistent judgment set J∗β that is described in Table 4. Because ψ[α ∪ β] is false,
we know that J∗β is consistent—it satisfies condition (2). Moreover, d(J
∗
β ,J
′) < d(J∗α,J
′).
Namely, the judgment set J∗α has Hamming distance 6n + 3m + 2 + 2u to the profile J
′,
and the judgment set J∗β has Hamming distance 6n + 3m + 1 + 2u to the profile J
′. This
is a contradiction with the fact that J∗α ∈ Kemeny(J
′). Therefore, we can conclude that no
truth assignment β : Y → B exists such that ψ[α ∪ β] is false. In other words, for all truth
assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true.
Corollary 8. Optimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny), Pessimistic-Manipulation-
(Kemeny), Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny), and Safe-Superoptimistic-
Manipulation(Kemeny) are Σp2-hard.
Proof. Σp2-hardness for Optimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny), Pessimistic-Mani-
pulation(Kemeny), Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny), and Safe-Super-
optimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny) follows from the proof of Proposition 7. In this
proof, all Kemeny outcomes for the original profile J have the same Hamming distance to
the judgment set J1. Similarly, all Kemeny outcomes for each profile J
′ = (J−1, J
′
1), for each
relevant insincere judgment set J ′1, have the same distance to the judgment set J1. There-
fore, the reduction can also be used to show Σp2-hardness for the problems Optimistic-
Manipulation(Kemeny), Pessimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny), Superoptimistic-
Manipulation(Kemeny), and Safe-Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny).
3.2 3-Clauses and Trivial Integrity Constraints
The result of Theorem 1 can straightforwardly be extended to the setting where Γ = ⊤
and where all formulas ϕ ∈ [Φ] are clauses of size 3. Clearly, membership in Σp2 holds also
for this restricted setting. In order to show Σp2-hardness, the proof of Proposition 7 can be
modified as follows, in two steps. First, we take many syntactic variants χ1, . . . , χu of the
integrity constraint Γ, and add these (and their negations) to the agenda. Moreover, all
judgment sets in the profile J include these formulas χ1, . . . , χu. Secondly, we transform
each formula χi into a 3CNF formula χ
′
i (by using the standard Tseitin transformation),
and replace χi in the agenda by the clauses of χ
′
i (and their negations). Then, all judgment
sets in the profile J include all clauses of all formulas χ′i.
3.3 Constraint-Based Judgment Aggregation
The result of Theorem 1 can also straightforwardly be extended to the setting of constraint-
based judgment aggregation. The algorithms described in Propositions 2–5 and Corollary 6
can directly be used in the setting of constraint-based judgment aggregation as well (so
membership in Σp2 carries over to this setting). Since the proofs of Proposition 7 and
Corollary 8 use an agenda containing only propositional variables (and their negations),
this proof can also directly be used to show Σp2-hardness for the setting of constraint-based
judgment aggregation.
3.4 Exact Manipulation
In the literature, the problem of manipulation in judgment aggregation has also been mod-
elled using different decision problems (see, e.g., [3]). One of these decision problems asks
whether the manipulator can report an insincere opinion to obtain an outcome that in-
cludes a given desired subset of the agenda. This problem is often called exact manipula-
tion. We consider two variants of this exact manipulation problem, and we argue that the
Σp2-completeness result of Theorem 1 extends to these problems.
Cautious-Exact-Manipulation(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a (possibly incomplete)
judgment set L ⊆ Φ, and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+.
Question: Is there a complete and consistent judgment set J ′ ∈ J (Φ,Γ) such that
for all J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J ′) it holds that L ⊆ J∗?
Brave-Exact-Manipulation(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a (possibly incomplete)
judgment set L ⊆ Φ, and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+.
Question: Is there a complete and consistent judgment set J ′ ∈ J (Φ,Γ) such that
for some J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J−1, J ′) it holds that L ⊆ J∗?
Proposition 9. The problems Cautious-Exact-Manipulation(Kemeny) and Brave-
Exact-Manipulation(Kemeny) are Σp2-complete. Moreover, Σ
p
2-hardness holds even for
the case where |L| = 1.
Proof. To show membership in Σp2 , it suffices to observe that the algorithms used in the
proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 can straightforwardly be extended to the case of Cautious-
Exact-Manipulation(Kemeny) and Brave-Exact-Manipulation(Kemeny). For Σp2-
hardness, one can use the proofs of Proposition 7 and Corollary 8, with the modification
that L = {w1,1}.
3.5 Group Manipulation
The result of Theorem 1 also holds for the setting where a coalition of individuals works
together by each reporting an insincere judgment with the aim of obtaining a group judgment
that is preferable for each of the individuals in the coalition [4]. This group manipulation
scenario is a generalization of the (individual) manipulation scenario that we study in this
paper, since individual manipulation coincides with group manipulation for a coalition of
size 1. The algorithms used to show membership in Σp2 can be straightforwardly modified
to work also for group manipulation for the Kemeny procedure. Moreover, the Σp2-hardness
results directly carry over to the setting of group manipulation for the Kemeny procedure,
since individual manipulation is a special case of group manipulation.
A more subtle form of group manipulation is that where each individual in the coalition
is required to have no incentive to unilaterally leave the coalition (and report their truthful
judgment) [4]. The Σp2-hardness results from this paper carry over to this setting for the
Kemeny procedure, since the scenario of individual manipulation is also a special case of the
manipulation problem for fragile coalitions. Additionally, the Σp2-membership proofs for the
individual manipulation problem can be modified to work also for the group manipulation
problem for fragile coalitions for the Kemeny procedure.
4 Bribery
Another form of strategic behavior in judgment aggregation is bribery. In this setting, an
external agent wishes to influence the outcome of a judgment aggregation scenario by bribing
a number of individuals. We model this scenario as follows. (We consider the formula-based
judgment aggregation framework; for the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework,
this bribing scenario can be defined entirely similarly.)
A number of individuals are performing judgment aggregation on an agenda Φ in the
presence of an integrity constraint Γ. The briber has a desired (complete and Γ-consistent)
judgment set J0, and a weight function w : [Φ] → N that indicates the relative importance
of the different issues for the briber. Additionally, the briber has a budget that suffices to
bribe at most k individuals. For all bribed individuals, the briber can specify an arbitrary
(complete and Γ-consistent) judgment set. The question is to determine whether the briber
can pick up to k individuals and specify judgment sets for these individuals so that the
outcome of the judgment aggregation procedure is better (with respect to J0 and w) than
without bribing.
To argue that such bribery can not be done easily in all possible situations, one can
establish computational intractability results, that give evidence that there are no efficient
algorithms that an external agent can use (across the board) to obtain a strategy for bribery.
Similarly to the case for manipulation, we can consider various requirements on the
outcomes after bribery (in relation to the outcomes before bribery). For instance, we could
require that every outcome after bribery is preferred over every outcome before bribery.
Correspondingly, we consider the following decision problems.
Cautious-Bribery(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ]→
N, a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+, a judgment set J0 ∈ J (Φ,Γ), and an integer k ∈ N.
Question: Is it possible to change up to k individual judgment sets in J , resulting in
a new profile J ′, so that for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J
′) and for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J)
it holds that d(J∗new, J0, w) < d(J
∗
old, J0, w)?
Optimistic-Bribery(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ]→
N, a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+, a judgment set J0 ∈ J (Φ,Γ), and an integer k ∈ N.
Question: Is it possible to change up to k individual judgment sets in J , resulting
in a new profile J ′, so that there is some J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J
′) such that for all
J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds that d(J
∗
new, J0, w) < d(J
∗
old, J0, w)?
Pessimistic-Bribery(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ]→
N, a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+, a judgment set J0 ∈ J (Φ,Γ), and an integer k ∈ N.
Question: Is it possible to change up to k individual judgment sets in J , resulting
in a new profile J ′, so that for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J
′) there is some J∗old ∈
Kemeny(J) such that d(J∗new, J0, w) < d(J
∗
old, J0, w)?
Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ]→
N, a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+, a judgment set J0 ∈ J (Φ,Γ), and an integer k ∈ N.
Question: Is it possible to change up to k individual judgment sets in J , resulting
in a new profile J ′, so that there is some J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J
′) and some J∗old ∈
Kemeny(J) such that d(J∗new, J0, w) < d(J
∗
old, J0, w)?
Safe-Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ]→
N, a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+, a judgment set J0 ∈ J (Φ,Γ), and an integer k ∈ N.
Question: Is it possible to change up to k individual judgment sets in J , resulting
in a new profile J ′, so that (1) for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J
′) and for all J∗old ∈
Kemeny(J) it holds that d(J∗new, J0, w) ≤ d(J
∗
old, J0, w), and so that (2) there exists
some J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J
′) and some J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) such that d(J
∗
new, J0, w) <
d(J∗old, J0, w)?
4.1 Complexity Results
In this section, we prove the following result.
Theorem 10. The following problems are Σp2-complete:
• Cautious-Bribery(Kemeny),
• Optimistic-Bribery(Kemeny),
• Pessimistic-Bribery(Kemeny),
• Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny), and
• Safe-Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny).
This result follows from Propositions 11 and 13 and Corollaries 12 and 14, that we
establish below.
Proposition 11. Cautious-Bribery(Kemeny) is in Σp2 .
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP
oracle that solves the problem. This algorithm is similar to the algorithm used in the proof
of Proposition 2. Let (Φ,Γ, w,J , J0, k) specify an instance of Cautious-Bribery(Kemeny),
where J = (J1, . . . , Jp). The algorithm proceeds in several steps.
Firstly, (1) the algorithm determines the minimum distance dwinold from J to any complete
and consistent judgment set J∗ ∈ J (Φ,Γ). That is, dwinold is the cumulative unweighted
Hamming distance from the judgments in J to the judgment sets J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J). This
can be done in (deterministic) polynomial time using O(log n) queries to an NP oracle.
Then, (2) the algorithm determines the minimum distance dminold (weighted by w) from J0
to any judgment set J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J), that is, from J0 to any complete and consistent
judgment set J∗ that has cumulative unweighted Hamming distance dwinold to the profile J .
This can also be done in (deterministic) polynomial time using an NP oracle.
Next, (3a) the algorithm guesses k indices 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ik ≤ p and guesses complete
judgment sets J ′1, . . . , J
′
k together with truth assignments α1, . . . , αk : Var(Φ,Γ)→ B, and it
checks for each j ∈ [k] whether αj satisfies both J ′j and Γ. This can be done in nondetermin-
istic polynomial time. The profile J ′ is obtained from J by replacing the judgment set Jij
by J ′j , for each j ∈ [k]. Moreover, (3b) the algorithm determines the minimum distance d
win
new
from (J ′) to any complete and consistent judgment set J∗ ∈ J (Φ,Γ). Finally, (3c) the al-
gorithm determines by using a single query to an NP oracle whether there exists some
complete and consistent judgment set J∗new ∈ J (Φ,Γ) such that d(J
∗
new, (J
′)) = dwinnew
and d(J∗new, J0, w) ≥ d
min
old . If this is the case, the algorithm rejects; otherwise, the algo-
rithm accepts.
It is straightforward to verify that the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial
time. Moreover, the algorithm accepts the input (for some sequence of nondeterministic
choices) if and only if there is some way of replacing up to k judgment sets in J , resulting
in a new profile J ′, such that for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J
′) and for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it
holds that d(J∗new, J0, w) < d(J
∗
old, J0, w).
Corollary 12. Optimistic-Bribery(Kemeny), Pessimistic-Bribery(Kemeny),
Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny), and Safe-Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny)
are in Σp2 .
Proof (sketch). For each of these problems, a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm
with access to an NP oracle can be constructed that solves the problem. These algorithms
are analogous to the algorithms described in the proofs of Propositions 2–5 and 11, and
Corollary 6.
Proposition 13. Cautious-Bribery(Kemeny) is Σp2-hard.
Proof. We show Σp2-hardness by giving a reduction from the satisfiability problem
for quantified Boolean formulas of the form ∃x1, . . . , xn.∀y1, . . . , ym.ψ. Let ϕ =
∃x1, . . . , xn.∀y1, . . . , ym.ψ be a quantified Boolean formula. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} and Y =
{y1, . . . , ym}. We construct an agenda Φ, an integrity constraint Γ, a weight func-
tion w : [Φ]→ N, a profile J as follows, a judgment set J0 and an integer k as follows.
We consider the variables x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , ym and we introduce fresh vari-
ables x′1, . . . , x
′
n and y
′
1, . . . , y
′
m. Moreover, we introduce fresh variables zi for i ∈ [n], fresh
variables tj for j ∈ [m], fresh variables ui,ℓ for i ∈ [3] and ℓ ∈ [u], where u = 10n+10m+10.
Finally, we introduce a fresh variable a, and fresh variables bj for j ∈ [2m + 4]. We
then let [Φ] = { xi, x′i, zi : i ∈ [n] } ∪ { yj, y
′
j, tj : j ∈ [m] } ∪ { ui,j : i ∈ [3], j ∈
[u] } ∪ {a, b1, . . . , b2m+4}.
We define the integrity constraint Γ as follows. We let
Γ = Γ0 ∨
∨
i∈[3]
∧
ℓ∈[u]
ui,ℓ,
and
Γ0 =

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∧
j∈[2m+4]
bj

 ∧

a→
∧
j∈[2m+4]
¬bj

 ∧



 ∧
j∈[2m+4]
bj

→ ¬a


∧



 ∧
i∈[n]
(xi ⊕ x
′
i)

 ∨
∧
i∈[n]
zi

 ∧



 ∧
i∈[n]
(xi ⊕ x
′
i)

→
∧
i∈[n]
¬zi


∧



 ∧
j∈[m]
(yj ⊕ y
′
j)

 ⊕
∧
j∈[m]
tj

 ∧



 ∧
j∈[m]
(yj ⊕ y
′
j)

→
∧
j∈[m]
¬tj


∧



 ∧
i∈[n]
zi

→

 ∧
i∈[n]
(¬xi ∧ ¬x
′
i)



 ∧



 ∧
j∈[m]
tj

→
∧
j∈[m]
(¬yj ∧ ¬y
′
j)


∧



 ∧
i∈[n]
zi

→

a ∧
∧
j∈[m]
tj




∧



 ∧
i∈[n]
(xi ⊕ x
′
i) ∧
∧
j∈[m]
(yj ⊕ y
′
j)

→ (¬ψ ∧ a)


∧


 ∧
i∈[n]
(xi ⊕ x
′
i) ∧
∧
j∈[m]
tj

→
∧
j∈[2m+4]
bj

 .
(Here ⊕ denotes exclusive disjunction.)
As a result of the definition of Γ, each complete and consistent judgment set J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)
satisfies (at least) one of the following four conditions.
1. For some i ∈ [3], the judgment set J includes each formula ui,ℓ for ℓ ∈ [u].
2. The judgment set J includes exactly one of xi and x
′
i for each i ∈ [n], it includes none
of the formulas zi, it includes exactly one of yj and y
′
j for each j ∈ [m], it includes
none of the formulas tj , it includes a, it includes none of the formulas bj , and J does
not satisfy ψ.
3. The judgment set J includes exactly one of xi and x
′
i for each i ∈ [n], it includes none
of the formulas zi, it includes all formulas tj , for each j ∈ [m] it includes either none or
both of yj and y
′
j , it does not include a, and it includes all formulas bj for j ∈ [2m+4].
4. The judgment set J includes all formulas zi, for each i ∈ [n] it includes either none or
both of xi and x
′
i, it includes all formulas tj , for each j ∈ [m] it includes either none
or both of yj and y
′
j, it includes a, and it includes none of the formulas bj.
We let J = (J1, J2, J3), where J1, J2, J3 are defined as described in Table 5. In this table,
the indices i, j, ℓ range over all possible values, and for each ϕ ∈ [Φ] we write a 0 if ϕ 6∈ Ji
and a 1 if ϕ ∈ Ji.
J xi x
′
i zi yj y
′
j tj a bj u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
J2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
J3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 5: The profile J = (J1, J2, J3) that we use in the proof of Proposition 13.
Moreover, we let J0 be as described in Table 6. In this table, the indices i, j, ℓ range
over all possible values, and for each ϕ ∈ [Φ] we write a 0 if ϕ 6∈ Ji and a 1 if ϕ ∈ Ji. In
addition, we define the weight function w as follows. For each j ∈ [2m+4], we let w(bj) = 1,
and for all other formulas ϕ ∈ [Φ], we let w(ϕ) = 0. In other words, the briber wants the
formulas bj to be satisfied, and does not care about any other formula.
xi x
′
i zi yj y
′
j tj a bj u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Table 6: The judgment set J0 that we use in the proof of Proposition 13.
We let k = 1. That is, the briber can bribe exactly one individual.
In the remainder, we will argue that there is some truth assignment α : X → B such
that for all truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true if and only if it is
possible to change up to k individual judgment sets in J , resulting in a new profile J ′, so
that for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J
′) and for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds that d(J
∗
new, J0, w) <
d(J∗old, J0, w).
Firstly, we observe that Kemeny(J) = {J∗old}, where J
∗
old is defined as described in
Table 7. The judgment set J∗old is complete and consistent, and has a cumulative Hamming
distance of 6n+3+3u to the profile J . It is straightforward to verify that no complete and
consistent judgment set has a smaller cumulative Hamming distance to the profile J .
Kemeny(J) xi x
′
i zi yj y
′
j tj a bj u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J∗old 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Table 7: The judgment set J∗old that is used in the proof of Proposition 13.
We observe that the only way for the briber to enforce an outcome that satisfies the
formulas bj, is to enforce an outcome J
∗
new that satisfies condition (3). Additionally, we
know that any such enforced outcome J∗new includes none of the formulas yj and y
′
j , as a
majority of judgment sets in the (modified) profile includes ¬yj and ¬y
′
j . Similarly, any
such enforced outcome J∗new includes none of the formulas ui,ℓ.
We argue that there is some truth assignment α : X → B such that for all truth
assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true if and only if it is possible to change
a single judgment set in J , resulting in a new profile J ′, so that for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J
′)
and for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds that d(J
∗
new, J0, w) < d(J
∗
old, J0, w).
(⇒) Suppose that there exists some truth assignment α : X → B such that for all
truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true. Consider the complete and
consistent judgment set J∗α that is described in Table 8. Moreover, let J
′ be the profile
obtained from J by replacing any single judgment set in J by J∗α (since the judgment
sets in J are symmetric, the argument does not depend on which set is replaced). We
then get that Kemeny(J ′) = {J∗α}. The only possible complete and consistent judgment
sets J∗ that could have a smaller Hamming distance to the profile (J ′) would have to satisfy
condition (2). That is, such judgment sets J∗ would have to include exactly one of yj and y
′
j ,
for each j ∈ [m], and would have to satisfy ¬ψ. Moreover, in order for such judgment
sets J∗ to have a smaller Hamming distance to the profile, it would have to agree with J∗α
on the formulas xi and x
′
i, for all i ∈ [n]. In particular, the cumulative unweighted Hamming
distance from J ′ to J∗α is 2n+6m+8+2u, and the cumulative unweighted Hamming distance
from J ′ to such a judgment set J∗ would be 2n+6m+7+2u. However, since ψ[α] is valid,
we know that such judgment sets J∗ are not consistent. Therefore, Kemeny(J ′) = {J∗α}.
Clearly, d(J0, J
∗
α, w) < d(J0, J
∗
old, w). In other words, for all J
∗
new ∈ Kemeny(J
′) and for
all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds that d(J
∗
new, J0, w) < d(J
∗
old, J0, w).
xi x
′
i zi yj y
′
j tj a bj u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J∗α α(xi) 1− α(xi) 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Table 8: The judgment set J∗α that is used in proof of Proposition 13.
(⇐) Conversely, suppose that it is possible to change a single judgment set in J , resulting
in a new profile J ′, so that for all J∗new ∈ Kemeny(J
′) and for all J∗old ∈ Kemeny(J) it holds
that d(J∗new, J0, w) < d(J
∗
old, J0, w). As we argued above, each such complete and consistent
judgment set J∗new satisfies condition (3), and furthermore, it does not contain any of the
formulas yj , y
′
j and ui,ℓ. That is, such a judgment set J
∗
new must be of the form J
∗
α, for
some α : X → B, as described in Figure 8. Fix this truth assignment α : X → B. It suffices
to consider profiles J ′ that are obtained from the profile J by replacing one of the judgment
sets by J∗α, as replacing a judgment set in J with a judgment set that differs from J
∗
α can
only increase the cumulative unweighted Hamming distance to J∗α.
xi x
′
i zi yj y
′
j tj a bj u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J∗β α(xi) 1− α(xi) 0 β(yj) 1− β(yj) 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table 9: The judgment set J∗β that is used in the proof of Proposition 13.
We now use the fact that J∗α ∈ Kemeny(J
′) to argue that for all truth assignments β :
Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true. We proceed indirectly, and assume that there exists
some truth assignment β : Y → B such that ψ[α ∪ β] is false. Then consider the complete
and consistent judgment set J∗β that is described in Table 9. Because ψ[α ∪ β] is false,
we know that J∗β is consistent—it satisfies condition (2). Moreover, d(J
∗
β ,J
′) < d(J∗α,J
′).
Namely, the judgment set J∗α has Hamming distance 2n + 6m + 8 + 2u to the profile J
′,
and the judgment set J∗β has Hamming distance 2n + 6m + 7 + 2u to the profile J
′. This
is a contradiction with the fact that J∗α ∈ Kemeny(J
′). Therefore, we can conclude that no
truth assignment β : Y → B exists such that ψ[α ∪ β] is false. In other words, for all truth
assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true.
Corollary 14. Optimistic-Bribery(Kemeny), Pessimistic-Bribery(Kemeny),
Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny), and Safe-Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny)
are Σp2-hard.
Proof. Σp2-hardness for Optimistic-Bribery(Kemeny), Pessimistic-Bribery(Kemeny),
Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny), and Safe-Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny)
follows from the proof of Proposition 13. In this proof, all Kemeny outcomes for the orig-
inal profile J have the same weighted Hamming distance to the judgment set J0. Simi-
larly, all Kemeny outcomes for the relevant modified profiles J ′, have the same weighted
Hamming distance to the judgment set J0. Therefore, the reduction can also be used to
show Σp2-hardness for the problemsOptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny), Pessimistic-Bribery-
(Kemeny), Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny), and Safe-Superoptimistic-Bribery-
(Kemeny).
4.2 Restricted Settings and Constraint-Based Judgment Aggrega-
tion
Similarly to the case of Theorem 1, the result of Theorem 10 can straightforwardly be
extended to the setting where Γ = ⊤ and where all formulas ϕ ∈ [Φ] are clauses of size 3,
by arguments that are entirely similar to the ones described in Section 3.2.
The result of Theorem 10 can also straightforwardly be extended to the setting of
constraint-based judgment aggregation. The algorithms used in the proofs of Proposition 11
and Corollary 12 can directly be used in the setting of constraint-based judgment aggrega-
tion as well (so membership in Σp2 carries over to this setting). Moreover, since the proofs of
Proposition 13 and Corollary 14 use an agenda containing only propositional variables (and
their negations), this proof can also directly be used to show Σp2-hardness for the setting of
constraint-based judgment aggregation.
4.3 Exact Bribery
In the literature, the problem of bribery in judgment aggregation has also been modelled
using different decision problems (see, e.g., [3]). One of these decision problems asks whether
the briber has a way of bribing a number of individuals (within their budget) to obtain an
outcome that includes a given desired subset of the agenda. This problem is often called
exact bribery. We consider two variants of this exact bribery problem, and we argue that
the Σp2-completeness result of Theorem 10 extends to these problems.
Cautious-Exact-Bribery(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+, a
(possibly incomplete) judgment set L ⊆ Φ, and an integer k ∈ N.
Question: Is it possible to change up to k individual judgment sets in J , resulting
in a new profile J ′, so that for all J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J ′) it holds that L ⊆ J∗?
Brave-Exact-Bribery(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+, a
(possibly incomplete) judgment set L ⊆ Φ, and an integer k ∈ N.
Question: Is it possible to change up to k individual judgment sets in J , resulting
in a new profile J ′, so that for some J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J ′) it holds that L ⊆ J∗?
Proposition 15. The problems Cautious-Exact-Bribery(Kemeny) and Brave-Exact-
Bribery(Kemeny) are Σp2-complete. Moreover, Σ
p
2-hardness holds even for the case
where |L| = 1.
Proof. To show membership in Σp2 , it suffices to observe that the algorithms used in the
proofs of Proposition 11 and Corollary 12 can straightforwardly be extended to the case
of Cautious-Exact-Bribery(Kemeny) and Brave-Exact-Bribery(Kemeny). For Σp2-
hardness, one can use the proofs of Proposition 13 and Corollary 14, with the modification
that L = {b1}.
5 Control by Adding or Deleting Issues
A third form of strategic behavior in judgment aggregation is control. In this setting, an ex-
ternal agent wishes to influence the outcome of by influencing the conditions of a judgment
aggregation scenario. Here, we consider control by (1) adding or (2) deleting issues. We
model these scenarios as follows. (Again, we consider the formula-based judgment aggre-
gation framework; for the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework, this control
scenario can be defined entirely similarly.)
We begin with the scenario of (1) control by adding issues. A number of individuals each
have an opinion for an agenda Φ in the presence of an integrity constraint Γ. That is, we are
considering a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+. However, they are performing judgment aggregation
only on a selection of issues, specified by an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ. (For any Ψ ⊆ Φ, we let
the profile J |Ψ consist of the judgment sets J |Ψ for each J ∈ J , where J |Ψ = J ∩Ψ—that
is, J |Ψ = { J∩Ψ : J ∈ J }. Intuitively, J |Ψ is the restriction of J to the formulas in Ψ.) The
external agent wishes to ensure that the outcome of the judgment aggregation procedure
includes a set L ⊆ Φ of conclusions, and they want to do so by enlarging the set of issues
that the individuals perform judgment aggregation on. Formally, the external agent wants
to select an agenda Φ′′ with Φ′ ⊆ Φ′′ ⊆ Φ such that L ⊆ J∗ for J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′ ).
(Obviously, if the external agent wishes to succeed, they need to choose some Φ′′ with L ⊆
Φ′′.) The question is whether the external agent can succeed in this. Since the Kemeny
judgment aggregation procedure is irresolute, we can formulate two decision problems.
Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ, a
set L ⊆ Φ and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+ for Φ.
Question: Is there an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ′′ ⊆ Φ such that for all J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′)
it holds that L ⊆ J∗?
Brave-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ, a
set L ⊆ Φ and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+ for Φ.
Question: Is there an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ′′ ⊆ Φ such that for some J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′)
it holds that L ⊆ J∗?
We continue with the scenario of (2) control by deleting issues. In this scenario, the
individuals are performing judgment aggregation on an agenda Φ in the presence of an
integrity constraint Γ. The external agent wishes to ensure that the outcome of the judgment
aggregation procedure includes a set L ⊆ Φ of conclusions, and they want to do so by
restricting the set of issues that the individuals perform judgment aggregation on. Moreover,
several issues are outside the control of the agent—these issues cannot be excluded from
the judgment aggregation scenario. This could be the case, for instance, if (1) the external
agent has influence only on issues regarding one theme, or if (2) various issues are politically
sensitive and excluding them would lead to controversy. This is modelled by a set Φ′′ ⊆ Φ
of issues that the external agent cannot exclude. Formally, the external agent wants to
select an agenda Φ′′ with Φ′ ⊆ Φ′′ ⊆ Φ such that L ⊆ J∗ for J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′). (Again,
obviously, if the external agent wishes to succeed, they need to choose some Φ′′ with L ⊆ Φ′′.)
The question is whether the external agent can succeed in this. Again, since the Kemeny
judgment aggregation procedure is irresolute, we can formulate two decision problems.
Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ, a
set L ⊆ Φ and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+.
Question: Is there an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ′′ ⊆ Φ such that for all J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′)
it holds that L ⊆ J∗?
Brave-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ, a
set L ⊆ Φ and a profile J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+.
Question: Is there an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ′′ ⊆ Φ such that for some J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′)
it holds that L ⊆ J∗?
Notice that the formulations of the decision problems Cautious-Exact-Control-
by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny) and Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues-
(Kemeny) are identical. However, the two different control scenarios that underlie these
problems yield different restrictions of the problems that are interesting to investigate. For
example, on the one hand, for the setting of control by deleting issues, it might often be
the case that Φ′ = ∅—that is, the external agent has full control on what issues to delete.
On the other hand, for the setting of control by adding issues, it is reasonable to assume
that Φ′ 6= ∅—that is, the existing judgment aggregation scenario is not a trivial, vacuous
one.
Unlike for the scenarios of manipulation and bribery, in this scenario of control we only
formulated exact variants of the problem, where the objective is to obtain outcomes that
include a given set L of conclusions, rather than obtaining outcomes that are preferable
according to a preference relation based on a weighted Hamming distance. This is due to
the fact that in this control scenario, the agenda is not fixed. As a result, it is unclear what
the agenda should be on which the weighted Hamming distance preferences are based.
5.1 Complexity Results
In this section, we prove the following result.
Theorem 16. The following problems are Σp2-complete:
• Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny),
• Brave-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny),
• Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny), and
• Brave-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny).
Moreover, Σp2-hardness holds even for the case where Φ
′ = ∅.
This result follows from Propositions 17 and 19 and Corollaries 18 and 20–22, that we
establish below.
Proposition 17. Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny) is in Σp2 .
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP
oracle that solves the problem. Let (Φ,Γ,Φ′, L,J) specify an instance of Cautious-
Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny). The algorithm guesses an agenda Φ′′ such
that Φ′ ⊆ Φ′′ ⊆ Φ. Then, the algorithm computes the minimum unweighted Hamming
distance dwin from any judgment set that is Γ-consistent and complete for Φ′′ to the pro-
file J |Φ′′ . This can be done in polynomial time using an NP oracle. Finally, the algorithm
uses one more query to the NP oracle to decide if there exists a judgment set J∗ that is
Γ-consistent and complete for Φ′′ that has Hamming distance dwin to the profile J |Φ′′ and
that satisfies that L 6⊆ J∗. The algorithm accepts if and only if no such judgment set J∗
exists.
It is straightforward to verify that the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polyno-
mial time. Moreover, the algorithm accepts the input (for some sequence of nondeter-
ministic choices) if and only if there exists an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ′′ ⊆ Φ such that for
all J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′ ) it holds that L ⊆ J∗.
Corollary 18. Brave-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny) is in Σp2.
Proof. The algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 17 can straightforwardly be
modified to form a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP oracle
that solves Brave-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny).
Proposition 19. Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny) is Σp2-hard.
Proof. We show Σp2-hardness by giving a reduction from the satisfiability problem
for quantified Boolean formulas of the form ∃x1, . . . , xn.∀y1, . . . , ym.ψ. Let ϕ =
∃x1, . . . , xn.∀y1, . . . , ym.ψ be a quantified Boolean formula. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} and Y =
{y1, . . . , ym}. Moreover, assume without loss of generality that ψ is in 3DNF. We con-
struct an agenda Φ, an integrity constraint Γ, an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ, a set L ⊆ Φ′ a pro-
file J ∈ J (Φ,Γ)+ as follows.
We introduce fresh variables xi,1, xi,2, xi,3, x
′
i,1, x
′
i,2, x
′
i,3 for each i ∈ [n], we consider the
variables yj and we introduce fresh variables y
′
j, tj for each j ∈ [m], we introduce fresh
variables a, b, and we introduce fresh variables ui,ℓ for i ∈ [3] and ℓ ∈ [u], where u =
10n+ 10m+ 10. We then let [Φ′] = { yj, y′j , tj : j ∈ [m] } ∪ {a, b} ∪ { ui,ℓ : i ∈ [3], ℓ ∈ [u] },
and we let [Φ] = [Φ′] ∪ { xi,j , x′i,j : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [3] }. Moreover, we let L = {b}.
We then define the integrity constraint Γ as follows. We let
Γ = Γ0 ∨
∨
i∈[3]
∧
ℓ∈[u]
ui,ℓ,
and we let
Γ0 = (a ∨ b) ∧ (¬a ∨ ¬b)
∧



 ∧
j∈[m]
(yj ⊕ y
′
j)

 ∨

 ∧
j∈[m]
tj




∧



 ∧
i∈[n]
(xi ⊕ x
′
i)

→



 ∧
j∈[m]
(yj ⊕ y
′
j) ∧ a ∧ ¬ψ


∨

b ∧
∧
j∈[m]
(tj ∧ ¬yj ∧ ¬y
′
j)





 .
(Here ⊕ denotes exclusive disjunction.)
We let J = (J1, J2, J3), where J1, J2, J3 are defined as described in Table 10. In this
table, the indices i, j, ℓ range over all possible values, and for each ϕ ∈ [Φ] we write a 0
if ϕ 6∈ Ji and a 1 if ϕ ∈ Ji.
J xi,j x
′
i,j yj y
′
j tj a b u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
J2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
J3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Table 10: The profile J = (J1, J2, J3) for the agenda Φ that we use in the proof of Proposi-
tion 19.
We observe that Kemeny(J |Φ′) = {J∗old,0} ∪ { J
∗
old,β : β : Y → B }, where the judgment
sets J∗old,0 and J
∗
old,β are defined as described in Table 11. The judgment sets J
∗
old,0 and J
∗
old,β
are complete (for the agenda Φ′) and Γ-consistent, and have a cumulative Hamming distance
of 3m + 2 + 3u to the profile J |Φ′ . It is straightforward to verify that no complete and
consistent judgment set has a smaller cumulative Hamming distance to the profile J |Φ′ .
Kemeny(J |Φ′ ) yj y
′
j tj a b u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J∗old,0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
J∗old,β β(yj) 1− β(yj) 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table 11: The judgment set J∗old that is used in the proof of Proposition 19.
We argue that there is some truth assignment α : X → B such that for all truth
assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true if and only if there is an agenda Φ′ ⊆
Φ′′ ⊆ Φ such that for all J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′ ) it holds that L ⊆ J∗.
(⇒) Suppose that there exists some truth assignment α : X → B such that for all truth
assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α∪β] is true. Consider the agenda Φ′′ that is defined
by letting [Φ′′] = [Φ′] ∪ { xi : i ∈ [n], α(xi) = 1 } ∪ { x′i : i ∈ [n], α(xi) = 0 }. We argue
that Kemeny(J |Φ′′) = {J∗α}, where J
∗
α is defined as described in Table 12. The cumulative
Hamming distance from J∗α to J |Φ′′ is 3m+ 3+ 3u. Any complete (for the agenda Φ
′′) and
Γ-consistent judgment set that would have less cumulative Hamming distance to J |Φ′′ would
be of the form J∗β , for some β : Y → B, as described in Table 12. Any such judgment set J
∗
β
would have a cumulative Hamming distance of 3m+ 2 + 3u to the profile J |Φ′′ . However,
since ψ[α] is valid, we know that J∗β is not Γ-consistent. Therefore, Kemeny(J |Φ′′ ) = {J
∗
α}.
Moreover L ⊆ J∗α. Thus, we know that there exists an agenda Φ
′ ⊆ Φ′′ ⊆ Φ such that for
all J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′ ) it holds that L ⊆ J∗.
xi,j x
′
i,j yj y
′
j tj a b u1,ℓ u2,ℓ u3,ℓ
J∗α 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
J∗β 1 1 β(yj) 1− β(yj) 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table 12: The judgment sets J∗α, J
∗
β for the agenda Φ
′′ that is used in the proof of Proposi-
tion 19.
(⇐) Conversely, suppose that there exists an agenda Φ′ ⊆ Φ′′ ⊆ Φ such that for
all J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′ ) it holds that L ⊆ J∗. By construction of Γ, we know that Φ′′
must contain exactly one of xi and x
′
i, for each i ∈ [n]. If this were not the case, one could
take some set J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′ ) and construct the set J ′ = J∗\{b,¬a} ∪ {a,¬b}. This
judgment set J ′ has a strictly smaller cumulative Hamming distance to the profile J |Φ′′ , and
is complete and Γ-consistent. This is a contradiction with the fact that J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′ ).
Now consider the truth assignment α : X → B that is defined by letting α(xi) = 1 if and
only if xi ∈ Φ′′. We claim that ψ[α] is valid, i.e., that for all truth assignments β : Y → B
it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true. Suppose that there exists a truth assignment β : Y → B such
that ψ[α ∪ β] is false. Moreover, consider the judgment set J∗β that is defined as described
in Table 12. This judgment set has a strictly smaller cumulative Hamming distance to the
profile J |Φ′′ than any set J∗ ∈ Kemeny(J |Φ′′). Moreover, since ψ[α ∪ β] is false, we know
that J∗β is Γ-consistent. This is a contradiction, and thus we can conclude that there exists
no truth assignment β : Y → B such that ψ[α∪β] is false. In other words, ψ[α] is valid.
Corollary 20. Brave-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny) is Σp2-hard.
Proof. Σp2-hardness for the problem Brave-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues-
(Kemeny), follows from the proof of Proposition 19. In this proof, either all Kemeny
outcomes for the profile J |Φ′′ include the set L or no Kemeny outcomes for the profile J |Φ′′
include the set L. Therefore, the reduction can also be used to show Σp2-hardness for
Brave-Exact-Control-by-Adding-Issues(Kemeny).
Corollary 21. Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny) and Brave-
Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny) are in Σp2 .
Proof. The algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 17 can straightforwardly be
modified to form nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithms with access to an NP or-
acle that solve Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny) and Brave-
Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny).
Corollary 22. Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny) and
Brave-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny) are Σp2-hard, even for the
case where Φ′ = ∅.
Proof. Σp2-hardness for Cautious-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny) and
Brave-Exact-Control-by-Deleting-Issues(Kemeny) for the case where Φ′ = ∅ follows
from the proof of Proposition 19. In the setting used in this hardness proof, the only way
to achieve Kemeny outcomes J∗ with L ⊆ J∗ is to choose agendas Φ′′ of the form described
in the proof. Therefore, the Σp2-hardness proof works even for the case where Φ
′ = ∅.
5.2 Constraint-Based Judgment Aggregation
The scenario of control by adding or deleting issues can also be formulated in the constraint-
based judgment aggregation framework. In this case, it makes most sense to consider the
extended variant of the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework where the in-
tegrity constraint Γ is allowed to contain propositional variables that are not contained in
the set I of issues. Because in the scenario of control by adding or deleting issues, the
integrity constraint is fixed, whereas the set of issues is subject to control by the external
agent, it is unclear how to adapt the integrity constraint after the set of issues has been
changed. In the extended constraint-based judgment aggregation framework, there is no
need to adapt the integrity constraint after the set of issues has been changed.
The result of Theorem 16 also holds in the extended variant of the constraint-based
judgment aggregation framework. The membership results of Proposition 17 and Corol-
laries 18 and 21 also apply to this setting. Moreover, the proofs of the hardness results
of Proposition 17 and Corollaries 20 and 22 involve agendas containing only propositional
variables and their negations. Therefore, these hardness results also work for the setting of
constraint-based judgment aggregation.
6 Conclusion
We investigated several decision problems that formalize the problems of manipulation,
bribery and control (by adding or deleting issues) for the Kemeny judgment aggregation
procedure. We showed that these problems are Σp2-complete in their general formulation.
The intractability results that we developed in this paper open up a wide range of natural
questions for future research.
It would be interesting to study to what extent these intractability results for strategic
behavior for the Kemeny rule hold up in a more refined computational complexity analysis.
That is, do these intractability results also hold (1) when we consider restricted logic lan-
guages to specify the relation between issues and (2) when we use the more refined framework
of parameterized complexity to capture natural restricted settings of the various problems.
In order to compare different judgment aggregation procedures on the basis of the compu-
tational complexity of strategic behavior, it is necessary to also study these properties for
further judgment aggregation procedures. Another natural direction for future research is
to study variants of strategic behavior that are based on different notions of preference over
judgment sets that have been considered in the literature. Finally, the types of strategic
behavior that we considered in this paper are not the only relevant types that one needs to
consider. An example of strategic behavior that we did not consider in this paper is control
by adding or removing individuals (rather than adding or removing issues). It would be
interesting to study such additional notions of strategic behavior in judgment aggregation
from a computational complexity point of view as well.
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